Phantom avy info? 04/06/11

The silly part here is that the trailbreaking was so deep that I could have easily stepped out, dug a quick pit, stepped back in and been back with the group in a few minutes...  but I was already sucking wind trying to keep up.  It just didn't occur to me to stop.

This line really struck me as it is very analogous to something that happened to me in my closest brush with the white devil.  When my body is under some significant abnormal physical stress (well beyond the expected rigours of a tour/climb) I have found that my thinking becomes frighteningly clouded.  I have learned to be aware of this and have dealt with it successfully.  What had not crossed my mind until now is that this occurrence is not unique to me.  If I see a member of my group experiencing greater than normal difficulty or pain I have to be aware that they may not be thinking at the same level they normally do.  I need to compensate by increasing my level of communcation so that I can draw out what they are thinking and experiencing.  I certainly don't mean to say that you weren't thinking clearly.  I have no idea what your mental or physical state was.  Your statement that it didn't occur to you to stop as you were "sucking wind trying to keep up" got me thinking about my own experiences both personally and as a member of various groups.  Thank you for making that statement as it has caused me to open my eyes to something that could prove important on some future tour.

Thank you Marcus for sharing the whole experience from start to finish in such a lucid way.  I am very glad that everyone lived to ski another day, even if for some that day is months in the future.

Marcus et al: thanks for the candid reports on your incident...they have given pause to all of us I'm sure...

Thanks also to pdelmi for posting the link to heuristic causes and decision making...I don't think I've ever read anything that gave a more insightful analysis into thought processes in the backcountry and why things can go wrong so easily...absolutely excellent material

The Rescue
The first team on scene was actually a private party, close friends of Roger's, who'd been scrambled by daveb after a text message from Roger alerted him of the situation.  They dropped what they were doing and sprinted uphill just ahead of the formal SAR response.  They must have connected with the SAR coordinators at the trailhead, because they brought up the first Cascade litter and some extra supplies. 

FWIW, I'm the daveb mentioned and I'd like to correct Marcus' above statement. All members of the first party were actually acting under the umbrella of Seattle Mountain Rescue (KCSARA) or Ski Patrol.  Fitz and Zac, personal friends of mine and Roger, were "deputized" as it were before we left base. I'd like to shout out to them here as well, as they greatly contributed to the rescue effort. Also thanks to the many SAR individuals that showed up from local units and Everett mtn rescue.

Marcus & Dan - I really appreciate the thought you've put into your open and honest self analysis of this accident. I think this avalanche hits close home for many of us and I know that some will actually take away tangible lessons from your story. So Thanks,

Dave Burdick

Thanks for the correction Dave (and nice to meet you). That explanation makes sense and I was unaware that they did that.

Seeing y'all sprinting uphill (and Fitz's comment about "knowing you're in trouble if the first person to come to your aid is a splitboarder" ) was a huge lift to our spirits.

I am the Doug in the party and I've held off posting until now because I wanted Marcus to complete his incredible recounting of the events [and because the damn administrator of this site wasn't sure he wanted to approve my new account registration, with good reasons that will be obvious soon!].  Marcus and Dan really covered all the details and I can't add much to their accurate and thoughtful assessments – but will still take up the next pages 7 through 12 of this thread…

The part of the story that cannot be overstated enough is how incredible the rescuers were and smoothly the rescue went.  The slide, what slid and decisions that were made/not made is probably what people on this board are most interested in, but my gratitude for the help of the rescuers is where my thoughts keep returning, so that is where I want to start.  After hanging out for six hours with two injured friends during a stormy day (it dumped all day - and snow continued to accumulate at our elevation until around 1400 despite what the lower telemetry data displayed) and then looking down to see a large posse of heroes charging up the slope led by friends Dave Burdick, Zac, Fitz followed by so many incredibly strong, smart and caring mountain people was one of the most amazing things I have ever witnessed.  From a distance, I have always been amazed and humbled by the selflessness of those who drop everything, leave their families and take precious vacation time for no compensation to go put them in harm's way to help strangers.  Seeing the rescue close up made me very aware how much time the rescuers had to put in previously to become so efficient at first response and at technical rescue. 

During haz mat and spill response incidents that I have been a part of (with police and fire professionals), I have witnessed things often getting started awkwardly as chain of command is established and a top alpha dog or dogs emerges, typically in a necessary but weird power struggle.  In this rescue, I saw flawless and quick communication between (mostly) strangers who got Dan's leg in a new traction split (replacing Marcus's improvised but as-good-as-gets split with a "real" traction split - the only difference was probably the comfort to Dan's leg to not have a ski pole lashed to it) and then quickly secured in the litter.   (Dan is so stoic, I think he may have attempted a one legged ski down, but we hid is skis and pretended they were both buried.) 

After both Roger and Dan were secured, a double rope system was used (one primary lower rope and a belay backup) to lower each litter off tree anchors.  The ropes were each 300' long and the anchored lower/belay setup were used for about 1500 vertical feet, so the first part was tedious but went smoothly due to competency of the team and the (mostly) fall line path used.  After entering the old growth below, the lowering was mostly accomplished by having about ten people braking/steering the litters using body weight and ropes (I will never, ever say anything negative about snow shoes again!).

By this point, Drew and I (accompanied by Andy Hill) knew the best thing we could do was get out of the way, let the rescuers do their thing as we slowly skied down through the trees.  Since we were in no hurry (we wanted to be down with Roger but we were having no problem keeping up with him for a change!), we chatted with groups of rescuers (most of whom had no idea we were in the party that got caught) and again and again I was struck by how positive everyone was, how much they were enjoying themselves and how not the slightest criticism was uttered.  After we reached the parking lot, and got a chance to thank (far too few) of folks staffing the base area - I got to hear from several beaming Search and Rescue leaders how they had the best team anywhere - which was not hyperbole from what I witnessed.  I apologize I do not have actual names, but I am eternally grateful for all that participated in the amazing effort!

Although I have never posted on TAY before, I think I have already used my annual allotment of space.  I cannot add much to Marcus'/Dan's recount so I will try to hit a few things not covered thus my thoughts will appear both random and include some info of lesser importance than what has already been said. 
1)  The Familiarity Factor – It is not surprisingly that this is the first heuristic trap listed in the paper linked to by pdelmi (thanks for posting that Peter D.) earlier in this thread.  I would put familiarity as the main reason why were more comfortable making riskier decisions on that day.  Almost 100 times up the same slope by one of the team equates to a lot of the familiarity.  I once skinned up this same slope three times in one day (with rescuer Dave .  Familiarity with this terrain had my mind thinking about how/if we should venture out into the Phantom Slide proper on the ski down since there is always avy debris there, but I have never seen debris in the particular area that slid so I was not thinking as much about our ascent path.   

2)  The Communication Issue.  It would be nice to come across a problem in life that can't be traced back to poor or lacking communication, but the older I get, the less this seems likely.  However, the importance of communication (or lack thereof) in this accident is anyone's guess.  I have toured a lot with Roger so fast movement, rapid assessment and limited communication is the norm (we actually talk and laugh the whole way, similar to this day just maybe not about our immediate environment).  The decision to not ski our objective was probably made collectively in silence and there was universal agreement to this decision when it was verbalized.  If the group consisted of ALL strangers, I assume the communication would actually have been greater but the level of familiarity between some of us made the amount of communication seem normal (to me at least).  I would suggest an equal factor to limited communication (as our lack of previous time together) was related to the strength of the party.  When I tour with my girlfriend (good skier but more risk adverse) or newer skiers - the communication is basically non-stop to the point of maximum safety but also inefficiency.   When I ski or climb with my closest and strongest partners, communication drops behind a collective trust in our collective abilities.  Obviously, unstable snow could care less how experienced we are, how well we ski or how many days we have had so far, so the relative strength and skill of party is something I will try to weight a lot less in the future.   Regarding Marcus’s thoughts about the value of digging a pit to increase the chance to talk more, I can only speculate here but I think that action would not have changed the outcome much.  If we dug a pit (probably in a much less loaded area than slid) I would guess it would not have added to our knowledge much and would have just affirmed our decision to turn around, but going to the  top of the Slot would likely have been proposed as a relatively conservative compromise.  I hate to admit this, but digging a pit may just have afforded me (or someone) the chance to say something regrettable about not being that concerned about dry snow sluffs.  I don’t think I will use “harmless” and “sluff” in the same sentence in the future as I have uttered occasionally in the past.   

3)  Gear notes.  None of the skiers in the party were skinning with pole straps on which may have prevented deeper burials or upper body injuries.  I do a lot of Nordic skiing so I can't bring myself to cut my straps off like lots of avy pros do, but I have thought more about areas where I need to not be strapped in the last few years.   I have used an Avalung for about three years now but have always wondered if I was caught in a slide if I would think to put the mouthpiece in while I am swimming and trying to get my feet below me.  All skiers in the slide did.  I have only thought of a Lung as extending that precious 15 minute period if you are buried, but Marcus hacking up a mouthful of snow after his Lung was ripped out made me aware how getting the mouthpiece in can block the snow from choking you.  Lastly, the binding release question really got a pretty good test in the slide.  Dan's Fritschi's were sheared off at the pivot point (amounting to the only good Fritschi field breakage I have witnessed of many).  Marcus's NTN's released quickly likely sparing him from leg injuries. Roj's O1s - coupled with his big Megawatts - may have played a factor in his injuries.  Although I have always favored the most active/powerful tele blndings (currently on Axls), my main concern with all "non-releasable" tele bindings has always been premature ejection not being retained in the binding.  Although they don't ski exactly the way I like, this incident will have me giving NTN another look. 

4)  Safety gear.  I think the natural progression, especially among alpinists, is to go lighter and lighter.  Interestingly, I keep on adding to my ski repair kit while my first aid kit has been getting anemic  (I have stopped bringing it all together on these "low-commitment" trips - familiarity trap once again).  Marcus had a lot of safety supplies and was extremely competent in their use – the rest of us probably could only watch and learn.  Marcus spoke about how the limited time factor contributed to some of our mistakes.  Well, the Slot dawn patrol has basically become, in my mind, an extended slackcountry trip - so much so - that I often wonder why I really need to take my "real" backcountry back (compared to my so light, so cool, so streamlined slackcountry pack) and anything more than a liter of water, a bar and gloves/goggles on a Slot lap.  With that said, I did have lots of extra warm layers with me that day and they all got used.  It is hard to imagine how much clothing an injured and completely sedentary person needs to stay relatively comfortable waiting six hours on a snowing, mid-twenty degree day.  I had the luxury of being able to move around to generate heat but wasn't wearing much after loaning some layers, or eating anything since I couldn't bring myself to move Dan's femur to get at the food in my pack which was supporting his leg;  so I got a little cold.  Being anywhere else would have probably meant spending a cold night out.  I have since purchased a few extra emergency bags/blankets which I hope will enjoy an uneventful life in the bottom of my pack for years to come.

5)  Skin track spacing.  Even the most novice skier learns the importance of spacing out on suspect slopes.  Being one of the most impatient people alive, I typically seem to follow a repeatable pattern on tours:  keep a good distance across the first few suspect slopes, less space on the next, and when the top is near, say ‘the heck with it’ and get right behind the leader in the skier's version of summit fever.  I owe Drew boatloads of gratitude for his very safe spacing distance and the luck of being behind him in the rotation as we neared the top.  Drew gave more distance than any skier than I have seen, so much so I started to get really cold and used the waiting time at the switchbacks to transition into my downhill action suit.  Drew's example is something I will really follow in the future.  Thank you, Drew.
6)  Tremper confidence vs time graph.  Several people mentioned that graph in this post, and I was speaking about it all day as we waited because I have been thinking about it a lot this year.  Truthfully, my confidence has slowly been declining over this whole year not due to a specific event but because the more time you spend out there, especially during an unstable last 8 weeks like we have seen, the more you realize how weak our avy forecasting ability is.  This event caused a steeper drop in my declining chart.  Now I need to align lower confidence with more caution which were not tracking evenly so far this year. 

If anyone is still awake and reading this, I wanted to end by passing along a little love from Roger.  He has been overwhelmed by the outpouring of support from this great community.  The good vibes experienced around his hospital bed and his house as friends and family came from all over to help has been an incredibly moving experience.  Roj will have a long recovery ahead but he has been truly moved by the love sent his way.  Keep it coming and book a lunch date with the man if your schedule allows. 

Be strong and heal quickly Amigo – playing in the hills just aint the same without you!

Great write-up Doug, thanks for sharing your thoughts. Lots of good stuff there to dig in to.

Rogmahaj: